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TRADE, STABILITY, TECHNOLOGY, AND EQUITY IN LATIN AMERICA
Chapter 12
Fostering Technological Mastery by
Means of Selective Infant-Industry
Protection
Larry E. Westphal
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of cross-country comparative research studies on the rela-
tionship of trade policy to industrialization have been completed over the
past decade. Although there are important differences of detail in the con-
clusions reached, the various syntheses of this research all agree on one
central conclusion: greater uniformity of incentives across activities and
higher levels of export achievement-individually and in combination-
are associated with improved industrial performance as measured by the
growth of manufacturing output expressed in either domestic or world
prices.' This conclusion is often interpreted in the following terms: though
modest levels of promotional incentives to infant industries may be in
See, for example, Little et al. (1970), Balassa and associates (1971), Bhagwati and
Krueger (1973), Balassa (1978), Bhagwati (1978), Krueger (1978), Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1978), and Krueger (1980).
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order, the closer the policy regime is to free trade, the better the industrial
performance is because a free-trade regime necessarily means uniformity
of incentives vis-a-vis trading opportunities and empirically appears to as-
sure the requisite high levels of export achievement.
The foregoing interpretation admits of the possibility that the "opti-
mal" policy regime may depart significantly from free trade in the treat-
ment of some industries because it does recognize the possible need for
measures to promote the development of infant industries. But there has
been very little empirical research focused on issues directly relevant to
the promotion of infant industries. To my knowledge, none of the under-
lying country studies [including Westphal and Kim (1982)] traced the evo-
lution of particular infant industries over time to see what lessons might
be drawn, nor do any of the syntheses provide an empirically grounded
discussion of appropriate means and levels of infant-industry promotion.
The central question concerning infant-industry promotion thus remains
largely unanswered. The question is, "Under different measures that
could be used to promote the development of infant industries, what are
the benefits, what are the costs, and do the former exceed the latter?"
Obviously, infantt-industry promotion is warranted only if its benefits ex-
ceed its costs, and the promotional measure that should be used-if any
should-is that which yields the greatest excess of benefits over costs.
An infant induistry is any newly established type of activity for which
the economy's existing endowment of skills and human capital does not
provide immediate technological mastery. Technological masterv con-
sists in command over technological knowledge as manifested in the abil-
ity to use it effectively. The costs of infant-industry development are thus
the costs of acquiring technological mastery, and the benefits are those
associated with the attainment of increased technological mastery. The
question of whether infant industries ought to be given promotional incen-
tives turns on whether there would otherwise be adequate incentives for
the acquisition of increased technological mastery, which in turn depends
on whether individual producers realize all of the socially relevant costs
and benefits of their own technological effort and whether they evaluate
costs and benefits in a manner consistent with social objectives.
It is not possible to make a quantitative assessment of the need for-
or, more generally, of the merits of--infant-industry promotion without
empirical evidence concerning costs and benefits. But, even were such
evidence available, it would not be conclusive. To assess the need for pro-
motion requires knowledge of what would happen (or, for an ex post as-
sessment, of what would l-ve happened) under various alternatives with
regard to the provision of promotional incentives. Such knowledge comes
only in the form of predictions that cannot be verified directly, except per-
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haps in the case pertaining to the alternative actually followed. In any
event, because they require the comparison of alternatives, at least one of
which is counterfactual, estimates of costs and benefits are of uncertain
reliability. Thus there may always be legitimate disagreement about the
need for infant-industry promotion, but the scope for disagreement is, at
present, magnified by the lack of empirical evidence.
The remainder of this chapter reviews the evidence that does exist, for
the purpose of framing some hypotheses about policies to promote infant
industries. The evidence with which I am concerned is of two types. First,
as a result of recent research on technological change in developing coun-
tries, there is considerable information about the nature of the costs and
benefits of infant-industry development, together with a tentative indica-
tion of the magnitude of the costs. Second, the recently completed cross-
country comparative research gives a basis for stating some tentative les-
sons about the promotion of infant industrics by means of trade policies.
These lessons concerm both the merits of protecting infant industries from
imports and the efficacy of fostering infant-industry exports. To give the
lessons substance, they will be illustrated by the experience of the Re-
public of Korea, the developing country I am most familiar with.
II. THE NATURE OF INFANT-INDUSTRY COSTS
AND BENEFITS
As just indicated, infant-industry costs are the costs of acquiring tech-
nological mastery in newly established activities. The benefits are in-
creases in the productivity with which the economy's resources are em-
ployed as a result of technological changes brought about by applying the
newly acquired technological mastery. It is often thought that the costs
are small, on the grounds that infant industries are typically established
through transfers of production technology from abroad. But the costs of
acquiring technological mastery include more than the price that is paid
for imported technology. They also include what is needed in order to as-
similate the technology.
The extent of indigenous effort involved in the assimilation of technol-
ogy has only recently begun to be appreciated, as case studies have been
undertaken of technological changes that have occurred within firms in
newly established industries. These case studies have shown that "manu-
facturing technology is characterized by a considerable element of tacit-
ness, difficulties in imitation and teaching, and uncertainty regarding what
modifications will work and what will not" (Nelson 1979, p. 18). That is,
important elements of the technology appropriate to a particular situation
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can be acquired only through effort to adapt existing technological knowl-
edge to that situation. To bring any venture to fruition-in particular, to
establish a new production activity-requires a great deal of iterative
problem solving and experimentation as the original concept is refined
and given practical expression, and this sequential process lasts for as
long as changes continue to be made in the operation of the venture. Re-
search at the firm level has demonstrated that this process can continue
indefinitely, that it is central to the acquisition of techrnological mastery,
and that it produces technological changes that greatly increase produc-
tivity.
Dahlman and Fonseca (1978), fcr example, examined the technologi-
cal history of an integrated Brazilian steel producer whose first plant was
established under the equivalent of a turnkey contract. In order to in-
crease the plant's production capacity, the firm gradually built up its tech-
nological mastery through a carefully managed process of selectively im-
porting technical assistance where needed to supplement its own
engineering efforts. As a result, the plant's capacity was more than dou-
bled from its initial nominal rating through a sequence of capacity-stretch-
ing technological changes, which took place over seven years. Because
these changes required very little additional capital investment and no ad-
ditions to the work force, they more than doubled the plant's total factor
productivity. Moreover, the acquisition of the increased technological
mastery initiated by this process eventually enabled the firm to design and
execute further additions to its capacity and to sell technical assistance to
other steel producers, principally in Brazil, but elsewhere in Latin
America as well.
More generally, firms have been found to undertake substantial tech-
nological effort in order to achieve a wide variety of technological
changes.2 These changes include stretching capacity through valious
adaptations (as in the example just cited), breaking bottlenecks in particu-
lar processes, improving the use of by-products, extending the life of
equipment, making accommodations to changes in raw material sources,
and altering the product mix. Some of the firms studied appear to have
followed explicit technological strategies aimed at specific long-term ob-
jectives; others seem merely to have reacted defensively to changes in
their circumstances or to obvious needs to adapt imported technology. In
turn, some of the firms have undertaken no appreciable technological ef-
2 The largest block of firm-level research has been carried out under the auspices of the
Regional Program of Studies on Scientific and Technical Development in Latin America,
jointly sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America, and the United Nations Development Program. For a re-
view of this research, see Katz (1978) and Chapter 13.
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fort and so have experienced no technological change.3 There have not
yet been a sufficient number of case studies to generalize about the deter-
minants of the extent and direction of technological effort by individual
firms, though it is apparent that economic forces have an impact, as do
characteristics peculiar to individual firms and types of technology.
Most of the technological changes uncovered in this research may be
characterized as minor, in the sense that they do not create radically new
technologies but rather adapt existing ones. Nonetheless, as shown by the
example of the Brazilian steel plant, a sequence of minor technological
changes can have a pronounced cumulative effect on productivity. In
fact, judged in terms of their impact on the productivity with which the
economy's resources are employed, the cumulative sequence of techno-
logical changes that has been observed to follow the establishment of a
new activity may be more important than the initial establishment of the
activity. This possibility has not been explored, as far as I know, but it is
consistent with what has been learned about the process of technological
change in the industrialized countries.
Studies of major technological changes in these countries have found
it useful to distinguish between what Enos (1962) refers to as the alpha
and beta stages. The former includes all of the effort leading to and includ-
ing the introduction of a radically new technology. The latter covers all of
the subsequent minor technological changes undertaken to modify and
adapt it. In his own analysis of the development and diffusion of six new
petrochemical processes between 1913 and 1943, Enos found that the cu-
mulative reduction in production cost per unit achieved during the beta
stage was greater than the initial reduction obtained in the alpha stage.
Studies of other major technological changes show them to have followed
the same pattern: the economic impact of replacing the old technology by
the new is generally less than the cumulative impact of the gradual im-
provements made after its introduction.
The assimilation of a new technology imported from abroad is a major
technological change from the standpoint of a developing economy. The
initial transfer is parallel to Enos's alpha stage. The comparable beta stage
is the subsequent, gradual improvement in the productivity with which
the technology is used. But the significance of the beta stage in assimilat-
ing a technology transfer appears to be far greater than is suggested by the
analogy. To introduce a radically new technology into the world requires
mastery of that technology; in contrast, to import a technology does not
require complete mastery of it, certainly not at the outset. Indeed, the
3 For an example and a highly illuminating discussion of why technological effort is not
automatically or necessarily undertaken, see Bell et al. (1980).
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case study research suggests that it is in the beta stage that most of the
increase in technological mastery is achieved.
Part of the impact of that increase is reflected in higher productivity
using the particular technology, but much of the impact spills over into
related activities. For example, the mastery gained in assimilating one
technology enables greater indigenous ptrticipation in subsequent trans-
fers of related technologies, thereby increasing the effectiveness with
which they are assimilated. In more general terms, increased mastery
gained through experience with previously introduced technologies con-
tributes to an economy's capacity to undertake independent technological
efforts, which may be to replicate or adapt foreign technologies or to cre-
ate new technologies. Further evidence of the achievement of technologi-
cal mastery in a number of semiindustrial countries is found in the fact
that they are exporting technology to other developing countries, and
doing so on an increasingly expanded scale (Lall, 1980).
To summarize the preceding discussion: A number of firms in devel-
oping countries have been found to engage in a purposive technological
effort to increase productivity and accommodate changing circumstances,
an effort that typically takes place in the context of day-to-day operations
outside that of formal research and development. Such effort appears to
be a primary means of acquiring technological mastery and is the principal
reflection of its acquisition. Moreover, such effort has been found to prod-
uce large increases in productivity, which translate into substantial reduc-
tions in domestic resource costs vis-a-vis foreign-exchange savings (or
earnings).' Judging from various case studies in addition to that of the
Brazilian steel producer previously cited, it may not be exceptional for
the unit domestic resource cost of production in a particular type of activ-
ity to fall at an annual rate of around 10% during the first five to ten years
of production.
Insofar as the cost of infant-industry development is the cost of pro-
viding experience needed to gain technological mastery, it is reflected in
reductions over time in the unit domestic resource cost of production. In
addition to providing valuable insights into how technological mastery is
achieved in relation to processes of technological change, the research on
technological change at the firm level in developing countries implies that
I Domestic resource cost per unit of foreign-exchange savings (or earnings) is the appro-
priate indicator of changes in productivity. Properly measured, it incorporates changes in
the use per unit of output of all inputs. In order to determine foreign-exchange savings (or
earnings) in net terms, both output and internationally traded inputs are valued at border
prices. Factor and other nontraded inputs are valued at shadow prices, which properly re-
flect relative scarcities. For a lucid exposition of the domestic resource cost indicator, see
Bruno (1972).
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this cost can be quite high, to the extent that unit domestic resource costs
of production may initially be more than twice what can be achieved on
the basis of less than a decade of experience. But this research clearly
cannot be taken to mean that experience necessarily leads to greater tech-
nological mastery and hence to increased productivity. Whether experi-
ence produces these results depends crucially on the extent and character
of directed effort to capitalize upon it by undertaking technological
changes, and such effort is by no means automatically forthcoming. Nor
should this research be considered to suggest that all infant industries
must depend equally on internal experience to gain technological mastery
or that all infant industries initially realize levels of productivity that are
equally low relative to what can be attained over time.
Infant industries can obtain technological mastery by means other
than their own internal experience. Most importantly, mastery acquired
in relation to one type of activity can-to varying degrees, depending on
the similarity of the underlying technologies-be applied in relation to
other types of activities. Thus, as indicated earlier, preceding generations
of infant industries provide benefits to succeeding generations by aug-
menting the economy's technological mastery. The use of existing tech-
nological mastery by an infant industry reduces the cost of its develop-
ment by raising the level of productivity with which it starts. Indeed, the
use of know-how derived from previous experience in closely related
types of activity sometimes provides immediate technological mastery,
making the newly established activity internationally competitive at its in-
ception.
Infant industries can also benefit from foreign technological mastery.
But the important lesson from research on technological change at the
firm level, as from other research more directly focused on inter, -tional
transfers of technology, is that technological mastery cannot be achieved
through the passive reception of technology imports.5 As stated pre-
viously, the capacity to use technology effectively results from the effort
that is associated with the assimilation of technological knowledge. Al-
though transfers of technology can assist the process of assimilation, they
cannot wholly substitute for it. Nonetheless, through direct fol-eign in-
vestment, infant industries can be developed solely on the basis of foreign
technological mastery; domestic assimilation of the technology can then
proceed over time by gradually increasing the involvement of local man-
power in various aspects of the industry's operation. However, it is an
open question whether direct foreign investment provides a generally ap-
plicable means of greatly minimizing or even avoiding the costs of infant-
' For further discussion, see Stewart (1979) or Dahlman and Westphal (1981).
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industry development. Case studies of firms created with direct foreign
investment have uncovered increases in productivity equally as large as
those found in domestic firms. In fact, the Brazilian steel producer dis-
cussed previously started as a joint venture involving Japanese interests.
To conclude: There clearly is no basis for expecting the costs of infant-
industry development to be the same irrespective of the type of activity,6
the industrial base that exists at the time of its inception, or the manner in
which it is established. The case study research that was just summarized
can thus be used only to infer that infant-industry costs may sometimes be
quite high. The inference is unfortunately weakened by the fact that none
of the case study research with which I am familiar makes clear whether
the observed increases in productivity led to international competitive-
ness or to something more or less than "best practice" levels of produc-
tivity. Thus, none of this research has attempted to quantify infant-indus-
try costs directly in terms of the implied level of promotional incentives.
Nevertheless, the research does suggest that, even for an "efficient"
infant industry, the domestic resource cost of production-evaluated at
prices that properly reflect relative scarcities-rtight initially be as much
as twice the value of the foreign exchange saved (or earned), with up to a
decade being required to bring costs down to competitive levels. Assum-
ing that production subsidies are used, the implied starting rate of subsidy
in relation to value added is as much as 50%. Alternatively, assuming that
protection is the instrument of infant-industry promotion, the rate of ef-
fective protection implied at the start of production is as much as 100%.7
These rates greatly exceed those that are either explicit or implicit in the
policy advice derived from the syntheses of cross-country comparative
research cited previously.
III. CONVENTIONAL PRESCRIPTIONS VERSUS
ACTUAL PRACTICE
Conventional prescriptions about promotional incentives for infant in-
dustries concern both the measures to be used and the appropriate magni-
tude of the incentives. In regard to choosing among measures, there are
well-known theoretical arguments against using protection to promote in-
fant industries. Baldwin (1969) provides a particularly compelling state-
' Because it appears obvious, I do not seek to rationalize the point that the costs of gain-
ing technological mastery are unlikely to be equal for different technologies.
I Throughout this chapter, reference is to the rate of effective protection after downward
adjustment to remove the effect of currency overvaluation, i.e., to the so-called net rate [see
Balassa and associates (1971, pp. 324 ff)].
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ment of the theoretical case, by first indicating that the problems of infant
industries are not necessarily peculiar to them alone and then demonstrat-
ing that protection may easily fail-where "more direct and selective pol-
icy measures" would succeed-either to offset these problems or to in-
duce the appropriate behavior.
In fact, many governments do employ direct and selective policy mea-
sures to promote infant industries, though the policies appear frequently
not to be "first best:" preferred access to credit on preferred terms may
be interpreted as a means of overcoming imperfections in capital markets
and differences in private and social evaluations of risk; use of public en-
terprises or the sanctioning of cartels or monopolies, as a means of ensur-
ing that the returns from technological effort are appropriable; industrial
planning that includes such things as project identification and prelimi-
nary feasibility studies, as a means of subsidizing the acquisition of initial
techTnological information; sharing in the costs of labor training and "re-
search and development," as a means of promoting the direct outlays
necessary to achieve socially "optimal" levels of knowledge and train-
ing; etc.
Nonetheless, nearly all of the same governments also protect their in-
fant industries against imports. And, whether for practical reasons or oth-
erwise, a number of economists have strongly argued in favor of some de-
gree of infant-industry protection. Balassa (1975), for example, gives a
particularly detailed and complete set of policy prescriptions derived from
the cross-country comparative research. He argues for modest levels of
infant-industry protection and, thus, advocates a two-tier system of pro-
tection: uniform effective protection at no more than 10-15% (p. 375) for
all manufacturing activities other than infant industries for which "excep-
tional cases aside, it does not appear likely that rates of effective protec-
tion more than double those for mature industries would be warranted on
infant industry grounds" (p. 376).8 In addition, protection to individual in-
fant industries should be temporary, according to a preannounced sched-
ule that declines to the level of the first tier over a period of, say, five to
eight years.
In another paper also concerned with deriving policy implications
from the empirical evidence, Balassa (1978, p. 50) further argues against
"differential [or, deliberately discriminatory] treatment to particular man-
ufacturing industries," and states that exceptions from the two-tier sys-
tem "should be made only in cases when it is well established that an in-
dustry generates substantially greater (lesser) external economies thart
S Reference here is to "potential" effective protection rates; "realized" rates may, of
course, be less in some activities and to that degree need not be uniform.
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the average" and "in the form of direct measures [e.g., direct subsidiza-
tion of research and development] rather than higher rates of protection."
As do many other researchers in the field, Balassa (1978, p. 50) bases his
argument again t "tailor-made" [or, "made-to-measure," in Corden's(1980) terminol' i] protection on "ignorance as regards interindustry dif-
ferences in socIai benefits."
But, not only do most governments protect their infant industries,
many appear to rely on protection as the principal instrument of promo-
tion by granting infant industries effective protection at rates well in ex-
cess of 20 to 30%. Included among the latter are the governments of some
of the most successfully industrializing countries. The effects of initially
giving much higher protection to infant industries have by no means al-
ways been inimical to successful industrialization. I have not tried to doc-
ument this observation formally with the care and precision needed, but I
am quite certain that it can be supported by the historical experience of at
least several countries. For example, the Republic of Korea (or South
Korea; hereafter referred to simply as Korea), widely touted for its out-
ward-looking strategy, appears to have used quite high initial rates of
infant-industry protection with successful results-success here being
indicated by the rapid achievement of international competitiveness by a
number of the industries that have been so promoted.9 High starting levels
of protection have also been associated with the successful development
of various infant industries in other semiindustrial economies, in Latin
America and elsewhere. (It should not go unnoticed that the indicator of
success that is being used here is far removed from even a crude assess-
ment of net benefits, but it is the only readily available indicator.)
Additionally, some countries-for example, Korea-appear to have
fostered the rapid achievement of international competitiveness by infant
industries that, on deliberately discriminatory grounds, were initially
granted whatever levels of effective protection were required to secure an
adequate market for their output as well as a satisfactory rate of return on
investment. (In Korea, "tailor-made" infant-industry protection has typi-
cally been afforded via quantitative restrictions on imports, with starting
levels of effective protection of as much as 100%.) This obviously does
not necessarily imply that differential treatment and high levels of protec-
tion are the "optimal" means to promote infant industries; but, signifi-
9 Evidence of the use of infant-industry protection in Korea is given in Westphal and Kim(1982), which is summarized in Westphal (1978). In turn, there is a variety of circumstantial
evidence of its successful results, some of which is given in these papers, albeit not in a form
that makes the case as directly as ;t might be made. Definitive evidence in this regard may be
forthcoming from ongoing research by two of my World Bank colleagues, Garry Pursell and
Yung W. Rhee. who are engaged in an exhaustive analysis of Korea's export performance.
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cantly, it does imply that differential treatment and high levels of protec-
tion may effectively be used to promote infant industries.
It is not my purpose to inquire why most governments appear to favor
protection as the principal instrument of infant-industry promotion or to
argue that they are correct in this respect. Instead, I simply want to estab-
lish that infant-industry protection can "work" in the sense of fostering
the rapid achievement of internationally competitive levels of productiv-
ity. This is admittedly a weak conclusion, for it does not even follow that
the benefits of infant-industry protection necessarily exceed the costs in
those cases where protection works. Moreover, infant-industry protec-
tion has not always worked. As will be shown later, the cross-country
comparative research provides a possible explanation for this. And, for
governments that choose to rely on protection as the principal instrument
of infant-industry promotion, this research also suggests how the conven-
tional prescriptions can be reformulated to take account of the possible
need for very high initial rates of effective protection. The reformulation
leaves intact the most important element of the two-tier system of protec-
tion advocated by Balassa, though it does prescribe highly selective dif-
ferential treatment to infant industries chosen on deliberately discrimina-
tory grounds.
IV. REFORMULATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION FOR
INFANT INDUSTRIES
Hereafter I shall be concerned with the question: How should protec-
tion be applied if it is to be the principal instrument of infant-industry pro-
motion? The rest of the chapter thus assumes that protection is the chosen
instrument. In additioD, following from the previous discussion of the
costs of infant-industry development, it will be assumed that the costs of
acquiring technological mastery are sometimes sufficiently great to re-
quire effective protection at rates close to 100% in order initially to ensure
adequate infant-industry incentives. Do these assumptions imply that all
or a very large subset of the not-yet-established potential infant industries
should simultaneously be given effective protection at such high rates?
The results of the cross-country comparative research clearly indicate
that the answer is no. The countries that have followed this approach are
those that have opted for an inward-looking strategy of extensive import
substitution. These countries by and large have experienced considerably
poorer industrial performance than those that have pursued a more out-
ward-looking strategy involving greater selectivity in import substitution
and more attention to the promotion of export growth. Nonetheless, as
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previously indicated, some of the latter countries-certainly Korea-
have used the same means to promote selectively chosen infant industries
as have been used on a more wholesale basis by the former countries.
The comparative evidence does not definitively establish that the pro-
motion of fewer infant industries at a time results in the more rapid
achievement of international competitiveness. Nor does it demonstrate
that faster achievement of international competitiveness by infant indus-
tries is largely responsible for superior industrial performance. Other ele-
ments associated with the difference between inward- and outward-look-
ing orientations are almost certainly of greater importance. To cite but
one such element: in company with many other commentators, Diaz Ale-
jandro (1975) maintains that the debilitating effects of the "stop-go" ma-
croeconomic policies stemming from poor overall export achievement are
among the most important factors in explaining the relatively poor per-
formance that seems to attend an inward-looking orientation. But, regard-
less of its relative contribution, accelerated productivity improvement in
infant industries should, in virtually all plausible circumstances, lead to
faster-paced industrial growth overall.
Thus the real question is whether greater selectivity (i.e., the promo-
tion of fewer infant industries at a time) results in infant industries that
either immediately upon their establishment are more efficient or after
their establishment experience more rapid gains in efficiency, efficiency
being judged by comparing domestic resource costs with foreign-ex-
change savings (or earnings) at prices that properly reflect relative scarci-
ties. In view of the paucity of empirical evidence having a bearing on this
question, it delimits a priority area for further research, though various
arguments can be made to suggest why the number of infant industries
simultaneously being promoted ought to affect the speed with which effi-
cient production is reached. For example, greater selectivity in import
substitution undoubtedly accompanies the delay in construction of initial
plants until the market has grown to an appropriate size; it permits scarce
investment resources to be concentrated in one or a few sectors at a time
and thereby enables greater exploitation of economies of scale and of the
linkages among closely interrelated activities. Greater selectivity equally
allows the concentration of scarce entrepreneurial resources and techni-
cal talent and thereby avoids spreading the agents of technological change
so thinly that no industry has the critical mass that may be necessary to
initiate a sustained process of efficiency improvement through the acqui-
sition of technological mastery. These arguments imply that the war-
ranted degree of selectivity depends on "initial conditions" within a par-
ticular country, including the overall size of its economy and the
availability of high-level manpower of various types.
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To summarize: absolute protection to infant industries appears to offer
a viable means of fostering rapid industrial development, but only if a rel-
atively small number of infant industries are promoted at any one time.
"Absolute" protection here means whatever is necessary to secure an
adequate market for the industry's output as well as a satisfactory rate of
return on investment. Absolute protection reflects the efficiency of the in-
dustry; thus, the level of absolute protection is something that can only be
determined "endogenously," for example, by basing protection on im-
port quotas (but see the qualification regarding sales for use in the produc-
tion of exports that appears in Section VI). As regards the precise number
of infant industries that it is warranted to promote simultaneously, not
much can be said without further research.' 0
V. THE EVIDENCE RECONSIDERED
Absolute, selective infant-industry protection is consistent with low
and uniform effective incentives to all other industrial activities." Indeed,
the cross-country comparative evidence indicates that applying low, uni-
form effective incentives to activities that are not being selectively pro-
moted is critically important, because it both avoids capricious discrimi-
nation among these activities and benefits export activity. All syntheses
of the evidence agree on this fundamental point, as they also concur on
the importance of incorporating other incentive measures together with
protection in evaluating an industrial policy regime and of distinguishing
between the two aspects of the structure of incentives. Of the latter, in-
dustrv-bias refers to the variance of the structure as regards the degree to
which differential incentives are given to different activities; trade-bias,
to the overall effect of the structure as regards the encouragement given
to import substitution (or domestic sales) vis-a-vis export activity.
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1978), for instance, in seeking to answer
why "the superior-export-performance countries do better compared
with both their own earlier growth performance under restrictive trade re-
gimes and other countries with inferior export performance" (p. 17), ob-
serve: "It would appear that the pattern of incentives, and hence of ex-
10 Observe that the level of aggregation at which industries are delineated matters a great
deal in this regard.
11 "Effective incentives" extends the effective protection concept to incorporate the im-
pact of all incentive policy instruments, including such measures as cash subsidies, preferen-
tial interest rates, and direct tax reductions, in addition to protection and whatever other
measures are actually employed in a given setting. A quantitative implementation of this
concept is found in Balassa's (1971) measure of the effective subsidy rate.
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port promotion, is less skewed [with respect to both trade- and
industry-bias] in practice than the chaotic pattern of import-substituting
incentives under the restrictive trade regimes" (p. 17); thus, "one could
argue" that the more "neutral" incentives found under the liberalized
trade regimes must provide some of the explanation for the greater effi-
ciency of the industrialization process that is empirically associated with
the export-promoting strategy (pp. 18-19). By stating the case in such
cautious terms ("one could argue"), Bhagwati and Srinivasan apparently
seek to distance themselves from those [including Westphal (1978)] who
have in fact argued the case. But, even so, Bhagwati and Srinivasan in
effect appear to accept its basic validity.
It would nonetheless be wrong to conclude that neutral incentives
lead to superior performance, and not merely because industrial incentive
policies provide only a part of the explanation for better performance.
Equally important is that some degree of industry-bias is warranted on in-
fant-industry grounds. In this respect, the selectivity with which infant in-
dustries are promoted appears to be of far greater consequence than the
relative magnitude of the effective incentives initially granted to them.
This result holds irrespective of the part played by protection in the provi-
sion of effective incentives. In turn, as previously indicated, absolute and
selective protection to infant industries appears to have been effective in
fostering the rapid achievement of international competitiveness in at
least one (if not more) of the "superior-export-performance" countries.
Correspondingly, the single most important policy prescription emanating
from past cross-country comparative research on trade policy in relation
to industrial strategy concerns, not the treatment of infant industries per
se, but rather the efficacy of giving low, uniform effective incentives
(hence protection also) to all industrial activities except a small number
that are being promoted on infant-industry grounds.
This is a paradoxical conclusion. Countries that have followed a strat-
egy of wholesale import substitution have undoubtedly done so, among
other reasons, in the expectation that it offers the best means to promote
the development of infant industries. Yet, by providing very high effec-
tive incentives to a large number of infant industries simultaneously (and
indiscriminately), they have failed in effect to provide adequate incentives
to any one infant industry relative to all other industrial activities, includ-
ing the other infants. In fact, the degree of industry-bias in favor of any
one infant industry in an inward-looking economy may well be far less
than that in an outward-looking economy that has practiced greater selec-
tivity in the promotion of infant industries and provided low, uniform ef-
fective incentives to activities that are not being selectively promoted.
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Though further research is needed to confirm it, the result appears to be
that the infant industries of the inward-looking economies are by and large
retarded relative to those of the outward-looking economies. Conse-
quently, simultaneous promotion of a large number of infant industries
"from the start" does not necessarily lead over time to greater breadth
and depth of industrialization; the sequenced, selective promotion of sub-
sets of these industries may, over the same period of time (which need not
be very long), nurture the same industries to greater efficiency.
VI. EXPORT PERFORMANCE
Low levels of effective incentives-in particular, low levels of effec-
tive protection to domestic sales-for activities other than those being se-
lectively promoted are also required in order to avoid an antiexport trade-
bias and thereby to ensure adequate export performance. Indeed, the
improbability of there being adequate export performance if effective
incentives discriminate against exports vis-a-vis domestic sales is perhaps
the most robust finding from the cross-country comparative research.12
Owing to the practical difficulty of subsidizing exports at high rates and
the likelihood that large subsidies would in any event invite retaliation
from overseas, provision of adequate effective incentives to exports rela-
tive to domestic sales precludes anything more than low nominal protec-
tion to the latter because export subsidies of one kind or another are re-
quired to offset whatever protection is given to domestic sales. Again, as
a practical matter, satisfactory export performance has also been shown
empirically to necessitate access at world prices for tradable inputs used
in export production and zero or very low exchange-rate overvaluation,
the latter to ensure that the prices of nontradable inputs are appropriate
(Balassa, 1978).'3
The only effective way to guarantee that exporters pay no more than
world prices for tradable inputs, including those that they purchase from
12 There is, of course, one exception: namely, an export tax is optimal for commodities
facing less than infinitely elastic foreign demand. However, this exception does not apply in
practice for the case of most manufactured exports, though the exercise of monopoly power
is warranted for products subject to import restrictions overseas.
1" Unless there is justification for temporary additional incentives to enter new foreign
markets, exports ideally should receive incentives equal to those given to domestic sales in
relation to value added. However, implementation of the polices indicated here often has the
effect of giving higher effective incentives to exports; production for domestic sale does not
necessarily benefit from access to tradable inputs at world prices and may not be fully com-
pensated for this by the nominal protection that it receives.
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domestic producers, is to give them unrestricted access to and tariff ex-
emptions on imported inputs (together with exemptions from indirect
taxes on al! inputs).'4 Thus domestic producers of intermediate and capi-
tal goods should be denied any protection against imports that would be
used in the production of exports.15 For all industries-including selec-
tively promoted infant industries-protection should be given, if at all,
for only that part of their output that is not sold for use in the manufacture
of exports.16 To reflect this in the ensuing discussion, it is necessary to
introduce several terms: indirect expotts will denote that part of an indus-
try's output that is sold for use in the manufacture of exports; non-export-
related sales will denote an industry's total sales less its export-related
sales, i.e., less its exports and its indirect exports.
Industries that have attained internationally competitive levels of pro-
ductivity are responsible for the bulk of export-related sales under the
"optimal" industrial incentive policy regime. The prescription that ade-
quate effective incentives be provided to exports relative to domestic
sales applies to these industries and is further implemented by providing
low nominal protection to their non-export-related sales, something that,
in principal, is easily accomplished (given the proper exchange rate) by
virtue of their efficiency. In turn, it might be expected that giving absolute
protection to non-export-related sales by selectively promoted infant in-
dustries would, in the absence of high offsetting subsidies, preclude their
exporting, either directly or indirectly (i.e., by sales to exporters). How-
ever, certainly in Korea, this is not the case.
Infant industries in Korea begin exporting-both directly and in-
directly-at a very early stage, often at once, notwithstanding that these
sales do not receive subsidies sufficient to offset the absolute protection
14 Even with slight protection in the domestic market and low currency overvaluation,
unrestricted access to and tariff exemptions on imported inputs lead to a bias in favor of
using imported as opposed to domestically produced inputs in the production of exports. To
offset this bias, the Korean government provides the full range of its export incentives to
producers of inputs supplied to exporters.
15 Satisfactory export performance clearly requires that exporters be permitted to import
capital goods without any restrictions, so that they are able to use the most appropriate pro-
duction methods. However, this may not preclude levying modest tariff rates on such im-
ports. In most industries, capital charges account for a small proportion of total production
cost (particularly in comparison to intermediate input costs). Thus giving capital goods pro-
ducers modest protection against imports of capital goods by export manufacturers would
generally have only minor effects on the cost competitiveness of exports. Such protection
may be justified by the unique role of capital goods production in acquiring technological
mastery.
16 This is the qualification to the meaning of absolute protection to which I referred in
the concluding paragraph of Section IV.
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that is granted only to non-export-related sales.17 For infant industries in
Korea (as elsewhere), effective incentives, including all of those measures
for which quantification is possible, are far greater for non-export-related
sales than for export-related sales. But many of these industries are either
m-onopolized or operate as cartels, which implies that export-related sales
may be explained in terms of discriminating monopoly.
The theory pertaining to discriminating monopoly indicates that non-
competitive firms may find it profitable to sell some of their output at
world prices even though these prices are less than the prices received for
non-export-related sales.'8 The theory states that a monopoly or cartel
that sells the same product in several distinct markets will allocate its
sales so as to equate marginal revenues across markets, one to another
and to the marginal cost of production. As a result, there will be an in-
verse relation between the prices charged and the demand elasticities in
the various markets. On the highly plausible assumption that the elasticity
of demand for non-export-related sales is less than the elasticity of de-
mand for export-related sales,19 the price in the protected segment of the
domestic market will exceed the border prices for direct and indirect ex-
ports. 20 Thus, assuming that protection enables separating the market for
non-export-related sales from the markets for export-related sales and
that the separable costs of entering into export activity are negligible, a
monopolized or cartelized industry that acts to maximize its total profits
may reasonably be expected to engage in export-related sales up to the
point where the marginal cost of production equals the marginal revenue
from these sales and to adjust its production and non-export-related sales
accordingly.
There is evidence that the Korean government has sanctioned non-
competitive market structures in order to elicit export-related sales from
infant industries.2 ' Moreover, the government has at its disposal several
17 Direct exports from selectively promoted infant industries never appear to have ac-
counted for more than at most a quarter of Korea's manufactured exports. (Comparable in-
formation is not available with regard to indirect exports.)
18 For the application of this theory to international trade, see Corden (1967), Pursell and
Snape (1973), White (1974), or Caves (1978).
19 Note that the "small-country assumption," under which the country is assumed to be
a price-taker in international markets, implies that export demand is infinitely elastic. On
this assumption, the derived demand for indirect exports is also, in essence, infinitely
elastic.
20 Border prices for direct and indirect exports are not equal; respectively, they are the
FOB export price and the CIF import price.
21 The sheltering of non-export-related sales as a means of encouraging export-related
sales has not gone unnoticed by other observers of the Korean scene; see, for example,
Krueger (1978, Chapter 12).
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policy instruments that, in combination, may be used to stimulate direct
and indirect exports from noncompetitive infant industries. Chief among
these is the export targeting system, which applies to both direct and in-
direct exports and under which indicative export targets are set jointly by
the government and the various exporters' associations (virtually every
industry of any consequence has an exporters' association). And subsi-
dies to export-related sales sometimes appear to have been jointly nego-
tiated simultaneously with export targets.22 But the government's lever-
age over these industries derives primarily from its control of the banking
system and, thereby, of credit rationing. Preferential access to credit for
financing of fixed investment as well as working capital has been a potent
instrument in the promotion of new industrial activities.
VII. INFANT-INDUSTRY EXPORTS
I do not know for certain whether other governments similarly encour-
age infant industries to engage in export-related productio'l; it is nonethe-
less pertinent to analyze the costs and benefits associated with infant-in-
dustry exports (here taken to include both direct and indirect exports), for
there is evidence that export activity can tremendously hasten the process
and greatly reduce the costs of achieving technological mastery. But be-
fore turning to this evidence, it is necessary to indicate that there may also
be costs. These costs stem from the fact that an infant industry may prac-
tice discriminatory pricing such that export-related production leads to an
increase in the price at which non-export-related sales are made. Granted
that an infant industry experiences a low level of efficiency, cross-subsidi-
zation of sales at border prices by non-export-related sales at higher
prices is required unless there are offsetting subsidies, as there typically
appear not to be.
It is widely appreciated that protection imposes real costs on domestic
consumers, at least in the short run. These costs may be increased by the
practice of discriminatory pricing on the part of infant industries. Under
the usual assumptions, including that economies of scale are not substan-
22 One of these subsidies operates through the "wastage allowance" that is permitted
when determining tariff-free raw material imports for use in export-related production. To
subsidize direct and indirect exports, this allowance is usually in excess of actual wastage.
Because profits can be earned by using the excess imports to produce goods for sale on the
protected segment of the domestic market, control over the amount of tariff-free imported
inputs allowed in relation to the volume of export-related sales (and hence, implicitly, over
the amount of excess imports) gives the government a means to influence the division be-
tween export-related and non-export-related sales.
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tial in relation to the size of the market for non-export-related sales, ex-
port-related production that results from discriminatory pricing can be
shown to impose greater costs on domestic consumers: that is, compared
with a situation in which the industry produces only for non-export-re-
lated sales, production for export-related sales leads to lower non-export-
related sales (even though total output rises) and, thereby, to a price for
non-export-related sales higher than that which would obtain were there
no export-related production.23
This result depends critically on the assumption that there are no
economies of scale to be exploited through export activity. But most in-
dustries are characterized by increasing returns to scale up to a nonnegli-
gible size. And developing countries sometimes appear to establish indi-
vidual industries well before the market for non-export-related sales has
attained the size at which increasing returns are exhausted. In such cases
and to the degree that it is associated with larger scale production, even
with discriminatory pricing, export activity can reduce unit costs of pro-
duction and thereby lead to domestic prices lower than those that would
prevail in its absence. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that ex-
port-related production, though associated with discriminatory pricing,
may sometimes lower the costs imposed on domestic consumers by the
promotion of infant industries.
But, this consideration aside, it is very likely that 'infant-industry ex-
ports will yield sizable net benefits because export activity appears to ac-
celerate the acquisition of technological mastery and hence to hasten pro-
ductivity improvement and efficiency gains. Insofar as they result from
ina'dequate technological mastery (as opposed to the exercise of monop-
oly power), the costs imposed by infant-industry protection are transitory
and diminish over time as technological mastery is acquired. Anything
that accelerates the attainment of technological mastery also quickens the
pace at which the costs of infant-industry protection decline. Correspond-
ingly, even if infant-industry exports initially impose additional costs,
owing to the practice of discriminatory pricing, they can nonetheless yield
substantial net benefits over time as a result of their effects leading to
more rapid productivity improvement and efficiency gains.
There are various grounds for asserting that export activity must lead
infant industries to realize faster technological change. To the degree that
efficiency improvement and other forms of technological change derive
from experience in production and in capacity expansion, export activity
must necessarily lead to greater technological change if it is associated
with greater volumes of production over time. But the direct effects of
23 For the reasoning leading to this result, see any of the follbwing references: Corden
(1967), Pursell and Snape (1973), White (1974), and Caves (1978).
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export activity in both enforcing and fostering technological mastery are
undoubtedly the most important. As to enforcing technological mastery,
exporting, whether directly or indirectly, requires the ability to meet
world standards in matching specifications given by the type and quality
of product involved. In turn, as to fostering technological mastery, efforts
to maintain and increase penetration in overseas markets lead to the grad-
ual upgrading of product quality. In addition, and perhaps most impor-
tant, there is clear evidence from Korea as well as from elsewhere that
exporters enjoy virtually costless access to a tremendous range of techno-
logical improvements that are diffused to them through various activities
of the buyers of their exports [see Westphal et al. (1981)]. Not only do
buyers contribute product designs and help to install or improve methods
of quality control, they also contribute to achieving greater efficiency and
lower costs through such things as suggesting changes in individual ele-
ments of production processes and improvements in the organization of
production within plants and in management techniques more generally.
A strong case can thus be made that the promotion of infant-industry
exports provides an effective means to basten the achievement of interna-
tional competitiveness. The argument may not pertain, however, to ex-
ports from infant industries created by establishing subsidiaries of multi-
national corporations, for there is no assurance that the activities of these
firms will contribute to domestic human capital formation or in other ways
yield real externalities through the diffusion of technological mastery to
local producers. (In this respect it is pertinent to note that most of Korea's
exports are produced by wholly local firms.) In any event, further re-
search is needed to verify that export activity induces faster technological
progress, as well as to examine whether and how export activity condi-
tions the direction of technological change and to demonstrate that infant-
industry exports do indeed result in positive net benefits over time to the
economy as a whole.
VIII. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY
The foregoing discussion provides one possible reason why the indus-
trial sector in a country like Korea, following an outward-looking strat-
egy, performs so well; namely, the possibility that its selectively pro-
moted infant industries exhibit superior performance as a result of their
export activity. This is by no means to suggest that it is the only possible
reason. But, if valid, its relative importance must increase as the time pe-
riod of analysis lengthens because the number of infant industries that
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achieve international competitiveness can be expected to increase with
the length of the time period, as can the relative contribution of these in-
dustries to the economy's total industrial production.
The questions that remain concern how the choice of infant industries
for selective promotion affects industrial performance. Does it make any
difference which industries are selected; if so, how should infant indus-
tries be chosen? The issues involved in the selection of infant industries
appear to be far more complex than those relating to how they are to be
promoted. Comprehensive discussion of these issues must therefore be
left to future research. But several issues do deserve brief discussion
here.
Potential infant industries are by no means similar in their need for se-
lective promotion, which is most likely to be warranted where the costs of
acquiring technological mastery are quite high. But selective promotion is
warranted only if the benefits of attaining technological mastery appear to
outweigh the costs, and then only if the necessary technological effort is
unlikely to be undertaken by individual producers in the absence of selec-
tive promotion. Many potential infant industries can-and therefore
should-be established without selective promotion. This is particularly
true for those that can benefit from previous experience in closely related
types of activity. Indeed, many of the most successful infant industries in
Korea have not benefited from selective promotion, including a number of
important export industries. Thus it is critically important not to discrimi-
nate against the development of infant industries that are not being selec-
tively promoted. This is, in fact, one of the strongest arguments for low,
uniform effective incentives-in particular, low and uniform effective
protection to non-export-related sales-for all activities except those
being selectively promoted. It provides an equally strong argument
against the use of quantitative import restrictions (as opposed to tariffs),
as well as against the use of various forms of restrictive controls on new
undertakings.
It must also be recognized that the choice of infant industries for selec-
tive promotion is not something to be done without regard to existing cir-
cumstances or without active consultation between government and pro-
spective producers. Choices must be made with a view to existing levels
of technological mastery and to the transferability of technological mas-
tery across successive generations of infant industries. A substantial ex-
penditure of effort in searching for and making use of technological and
economic information is needed to make so-und choices. Much of this ef-
fort should be, and often is, undertaken by prospective producers, but
their forecasts of costs and benefits require independent appraisal. Fur-
thermore, choices should be subject to revision in the light of additional
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information and experience gained in successive phases of identification
and implementation. Indeed, it is to be expected that some mistakes will
be made in the initial identification of particular types of activity as being
suitable for selective promotion. It is therefore very important to recog-
nize mistakes and take remedial action quickly, as well as to learn from
past mistakes in making future choices. These and many other considera-
tions imply that selective infant-industry promotion requires a high level
of competence in its administration. Such competence can be learned, but
it is apparent that conditions conducive to its being learned and effec-
tively applied are not present in all countries.
Finally, what importance should be attached to trading possibilities in
the choice of infant industries for selective promotion? Even granted that
comparative advantage is not innate but is acquired through effort to
achieve technological mastery, it does not follow that trading possibilities
should be neglected. What is remarkable in this respect about a country
like Korea is that infant industries often appear to be selectively promoted
on the grounds of their export potential, whereas infants selectively pro-
moted on other grounds are also expected to develop exports, either
dfrectly or indirectly. Moreover, the Korean government has, on several
occasions, put aside its initial plans for selectively promoting particular
industries when additional information indicated that they would not
achieve international competitiveness within a reasonable length of time.
These may be the most important distinguishing characteristics of an
export-promoting strategy. In turn. as already suggested, the efficacy of
this strategy might also be found in the impact of export activity on the
speed with which technological mastery is acquired and the pace at which
technological change takes place. These observations could provide a
large part of the explanation for why such a pronounced difference in
growth performance is associated with a strategy of export promotion as
contrasted with one of imp-rt substitution. But further research is needed
to confirm that the dynamics of technological change are indeed central to
understanding this difference and that the implications for industrial pol-
icy conform tc the reformulation of conventional prescriptions previously
given.
IX. POSTSCRIPT
To the degree that the foregoing arguments rest on what I believe un-
derlies Korea's successful industrialization, it is important to give explicit
recognition to the fact that Korea's industrialization appears recently to
have faltered somewhat. In particular, substantial difficulty has been en-
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countered in developing its most recent set of infant industries, which are
in the so-called heavy industries. What I know about the situation sug-
gests that the difficulty stems from the Korean government's initial deci-
sion to promote too many infant industries at once and from its subse-
quent-and newly acquired-reluctance to abandon or radically revise
its plans on the basis of information and experience accumulated over
time. Thus, Korea's recent problems may provide additional evidence to
support the need for selectivity in the promotion of infant industries.
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